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Comparisons Between Enron and Other
Types of Corporate Misconduct:
Compliance with Law and Ethical Decision
Making as the Best Form of Public Relations
By Cheryl L. Wade1
DIFFERENCES IN REACTION TO VARIOUS TYPES OF CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT OFFER LESSONS ABOUT CORPORATE REALITIES
One of the most important lessons that Enron offers is that sometimes
managers lie and boards fail to do their jobs.  Enron’s most valuable lessons
relate to corporate governance, financial disclosure, accounting practices,
and the management of pension funds.  One of the most illuminating lessons
that Enron offers, however, may be found in the reaction of jurists, legal
scholars, the media, corporate professionals, elected officials, and the
investing public to the Enron collapse.  The general sense of public outrage
is as large as the huge financial loss suffered by investors and employees.
There is a lesson to be derived from the differences in social, political,
and legal discourse surrounding Enron and similar discourse and reaction to
other types of corporate misconduct.  The social, political, and legal outrage
over Enron is far greater than the reaction to the other kinds of corporate
wrongdoing that I describe in this essay.  I focus primarily on the problem of
racial discrimination, comparing the relatively mild public reaction to alle-
gations of racial discrimination in the corporate workplace to the furor
created by the Enron scandal.
The Enron scandal also demonstrates the power of public reaction to
corporate wrongdoing.  Some observers predict that the reaction of the
public will lead to significant changes in financial reporting and auditing
systems.  Corporate managers care about their public image.  Corporate
lawyers should explain to managers that the best way to protect a company’s
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public image is to comply with all applicable laws and behave in socially
responsible ways.  There may be greater monitoring of corporate miscon-
duct relating to accounting practices in Enron’s aftermath, but Enron should
also result in greater vigilance with respect to other types of wrongdoing.
The lessons found in examining reaction to the Enron bankruptcy are
illustrated when comparing public reaction to other types of misconduct.
Some of the public is outraged, for example, by the allegations and sub-
sequent admission by tobacco companies that they misled the public about
the dangers of cigarette smoking.  The pervasiveness of public outrage in
this context, however, is not as extensive as the public’s reaction to the Enron
bankruptcy.  Perhaps this may be explained by the conclusion of many that
cigarette smokers themselves must bear responsibility for the choices they
made to begin smoking.
Another instructive comparison can be made between reaction to the Enron
bankruptcy and reaction to the Ford/Firestone controversy.  Drivers perished,
but neither company accepted responsibility.  Each company placed blame
on the other instead of coming together to find life saving resolutions.2   There
was public outrage, but the discourse about the Ford/Firestone controversy
never rose to the level of the extensive legal, social, and political discussions
that have taken place concerning Enron.
Racial discrimination in the corporate workplace and the public’s reac-
tion to such allegations are also informative, especially when compared to
the Enron fallout.  Hosts and callers into conservative talk radio shows com-
plained about the interference of civil rights activists into the private matters
of Texaco’s business.  One of the lessons learned by corporate attorneys from
the allegations of racial discrimination at Texaco was that meetings and
discussions that may be construed as discriminatory should not be memori-
alized.  For some, the Texaco lesson was that incriminating evidence should
be destroyed.3   The racial discrimination suit filed against Texaco may never
have been settled if a white Texaco officer, disgruntled about what he per-
ceived as unfair age discrimination that was forcing him out of the company,
had not turned over tapes that allegedly contained indisputable evidence of
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Texaco’s toxic culture of racism.4   Evidence relating to the plaintiffs’ racial
discrimination suit was concealed; some was destroyed.  The public outrage,
however, about the obstruction of justice on the part of some of Texaco’s
officers paled in comparison to the public outrage at the charges that Enron
and its accountants, Arthur Andersen, systematically shredded incriminating
evidence.
Perhaps the public reaction to Enron is greater than public reaction to
racial discrimination at Texaco because more people are affected by the Enron
bankruptcy.  Enron employees lost their jobs and some employees lost their
savings.  Other investors suffered huge losses as a direct result of the Enron
collapse.  The investing public in general suffered losses as the market
reacted to investors’ fears that the accounting practices of other companies
potentially hid troubled corporate realities.  The racial discrimination that
occurred at Texaco was profoundly damaging to the self-esteem and well-
being of large numbers of Texaco employees.  This kind of discrimination in
promotion and hiring perpetuates the legacy of inferiority that has plagued
Americans of African descent since the times of slavery.5   The harm to Texaco
employees was profoundly egregious, but it did not reach beyond those
employees and their families.
The most interesting difference in public reaction to Enron and Texaco is
that most observers hesitated to believe that Texaco officers would dis-
criminate or try to conceal evidence.  Most were reluctant to hold the board
accountable for failures in oversight of potentially discriminatory employ-
ment practices.  This may be explained by differences in the nature of
alleged wrongdoing at Texaco as compared to allegations of executive
misconduct and directorial lapses at Enron.  Misleading accounting prac-
tices and boards that do not seek enough information about the circumstances
surrounding such practices are recognizable when investigated.  Racial
discrimination, on the other hand, is subtle, sometimes unconscious, and there-
fore, more difficult to detect.6   Even when it is explicit, attempts to conceal
it, when challenged, are extensive.
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Because there was no social and political outrage concerning racial
discrimination at Texaco, another corporate giant, Coca-Cola, paid an amount
even larger than that paid by Texaco to settle a class action racial discrimi-
nation suit.7
Several commentators have spoken in recent months in less controversial
terms about the lessons to be derived from the Enron debacle.  For example,
one writer suggests that many Americans have too much admiration for, and
have placed too much power and confidence in, the corporate heads of large
publicly-held companies.8   “In the 1980’s and ’90’s, Lee Iacocca, Sam Walton,
Bill Gates, Andy Grove, Jack Welch, and their ilk became our new heroes.”9
The lesson this writer illuminates for the American public is the need to have
more realistic expectations of entrepreneurs.  We should not place them on
pedestals.10
Another observer concludes that Enron offers lessons regarding the need
for reform in several areas.  Corporate financial reporting, auditing, and
compliance with law systems must be enhanced.  There should be better
mechanisms in place for detecting fraud.11   The specific suggestions made
include taking “the job of choosing the auditors away from a company’s
bosses” and abating the practice of having one person serve as chairman of
the board and chief executive officer at the same time.12   The commentator
also suggests that outside directors exert more influence.13
These are not new suggestions.  It has been long assumed that directors
who are not employed by the company and therefore not required to monitor
their boss, the chief executive officer, will be better monitors.  Commentators
have written about the problems inherent in not separating the positions of
chairman and chief executive officer. One of the board’s most fundamental
tasks is to monitor corporate officers.  This monitoring function is severely
impeded when the board’s chairman is also the chief executive officer whom
the board is expected to monitor.  The other suggestions, such as not
allowing the audited to choose the auditors, seem intuitively sensible.  The
fact that the suggestions are not new, however, is the real Enron lesson.  “[T]he
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bigger lessons that Enron offers for accounting and corporate governance
have long been familiar from previous scandals, in America and elsewhere.
That makes it all the more urgent to respond now with the right reforms.”14
DIRECTORIAL AND MANAGERIAL FIDUCIARY BREACHES AND
POTENTIALLY CRIMINAL CONDUCT AT ENRON
Newspaper accounts of the report drafted by members of a special
committee of the Enron board formed after the company’s problems became
public suggest that at least some managers may have engaged in criminal
wrongdoing.15   William Powers, the special committee chair and dean of the
University of Texas School of Law, concluded that Enron’s board of direc-
tors breached its fiduciary duty of care owed the company’s shareholders.16
The very culture at Enron risked the kinds of managerial breaches and
possibly criminal conduct that occurred.17   One former Enron manager
observed that “[t]he environment was ripe for abuse. . . . It was completely
hands-off management.  A situation like that requires tight controls.  Instead,
it was a runaway train.”18   In fact, Enron’s board did not hold the company’s
Risk Assessment & Control group accountable.  The group that was
supposed to serve as an internal mechanism to manage risky corporate con-
duct reported to Jeffrey Skilling, the executive who incited excessively risky
conduct at Enron.19   Jeffrey Skilling “created and embodied the in-your-face
Enron culture, where risk-taking, deal-making, and ‘thinking outside the box’
were richly rewarded, while controls appeared loose at best.”20
A great deal has been written about the fiduciary duty of care directors
owe shareholders.  One question raised by Enron’s corporate governance
lapses is how to measure satisfaction of the duty of care on the part of Enron’s
corporate officers.  Reasonableness governs the duty of care owed by both
directors and officers.  The  standard of care owed by officers and directors
may be the same, but the amount of care owed by a company’s managers of
day to day affairs should be unavoidably higher than the amount of care
owed by a company’s outside directors with far less contact and involve-
ment with the company.
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE102
Enron managers such as Andrew Fastow, the company’s former Execu-
tive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, clearly breached fiduciary
duties owed shareholders.  Fastow breached the duty of loyalty because he
had a material financial interest in the transactions between Enron and the
investment partnerships he created and managed.21   Other Enron employees
who enriched themselves also breached fiduciary duties of loyalty.22
What about the Enron managers who did not reap pecuniary benefits from
Enron’s transactions with the suspect partnerships?  They may not have
breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty, but they may have breached the
fiduciary duty of care they owe shareholders.  One Enron executive observed
that Jeffrey Skilling “surrounded himself with ‘yes men.’”23   It would be
reasonable to argue that “yes men” breached the duty of care by invariably
saying yes instead of adequately investigating, monitoring, and ensuring
compliance with law.
One cannot ignore the troubling relationship between Enron’s managers
and board.  “The directors have maintained . . . that they were misled by
some Enron executives and were never told about critical transactions.”24
According to some newspaper accounts, transactions were hidden from the
board.25   At this point, the extent to which managers misled the board is
unclear.  There are clear allegations, however, that Kenneth Lay, the former
chair of Enron Board of Directors, was “disengaged and unfamiliar with many
aspects of his own company.”26   If this characterization of Lay’s tenure as
chairman of the board is accurate, he has in fact breached the duty of care he
owes shareholders.
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY AND ANOTHER
TYPE OF CORPORATE WRONGDOING: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Even if jurists, politicians, investors, and the public in general are
surprised about the specifics of alleged wrongdoing at Enron, most believe
that, whatever the facts, enhanced scrutiny of other publicly-held companies
is warranted.  There are significant similarities that I will enumerate in the
paragraphs that follow between the Enron bankruptcy and the directorial and
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managerial conduct that led up to it and the racially toxic corporate cultures
at Texaco and Coca-Cola that resulted in the filing of class action racial
discrimination suits.  In spite of the similarities, however, there was no out-
cry for enhanced monitoring of equal employment practices in the aftermath
of the large settlements paid by Texaco and Coca-Cola.
The similarities between the Enron saga and the debacles at Texaco and
Coca-Cola are numerous.  Enron’s bankruptcy and pervasive racial dis-
crimination at Texaco and Coca-Cola are the results of corporate governance
failures.  Boards and managers failed to satisfy fiduciary duties and these
failures led to shareholder losses.27   Enron’s shareholders, its employees,
and the investing public suffered large pecuniary losses.  Similarly, share-
holder and non-shareholder groups, specifically employees, were harmed by
pervasive racial discrimination at Texaco and Coca-Cola.  Also, in both
contexts, it was not clear when unethical conduct became illegal conduct.
Were accounting practices and securities transactions at Enron merely
misleading, or were they illegal?  Were promotion denials for African
American employees at Texaco and Coca-Cola the result of racial dis-
crimination or merely the consequence of meritocratic decision making?
Additionally, allegations of wrongdoing at Enron, Texaco, and Coca-Cola
were answered by the denials of corporate executives and spokespersons
before the allegations were adequately investigated.28
Another comparison is found in the fact that one of the problems that led
to the public humiliation of Enron, Texaco, and Coca-Cola was the fact that
the managers were not able to police themselves.  One commentator observed
that one of the lessons to be learned from Enron was that corporate managers
should not be the ones to choose the auditors who are supposed to ensure
compliance with law.29   Similarly, part of the settlement of the racial discrimi-
nation litigation against Texaco and Coca-Cola included the appointment of
a committee of individuals with no prior relationship with the company to
oversee compliance with laws prohibiting discrimination for years after the
settlement date.  The boards and managers at Texaco and Coca-Cola could
not be entrusted with ensuring corporate compliance.  Moreover, egregious
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directorial and managerial misconduct and fiduciary duty breaches occurred
at Enron, Texaco, and Coca-Cola in spite of the existence and applicability
of securities laws, accounting standards, and anti-discrimination law.  The
final comparison is that Enron and Texaco attempted to destroy evidence of
wrongdoing.30
The difference in public reaction to the Enron bankruptcy on the one hand,
and the allegations of racial discrimination on the other hand, present a
significant and meaningful dissimilarity.  The public’s outrage in reaction to
Enron is an interesting contrast to the much quieter reaction of the public to
the details that led up to the filing of racial discrimination litigation against
Texaco and Coca-Cola.  Elected officials and the public demanded greater
vigilance and examination of the accounting practices of companies other
than Enron.  “Even companies once considered above suspicion are being
subjected to increasing scrutiny.”31   There were no public calls for enhanced
scrutiny of the equal opportunity employment practices of companies other
than Texaco and Coca-Cola after the two class actions were settled.  There
was no demand for heightened vigilance of companies with few or, more
often than not, no people of color in their ranks of senior executives or on
their boards of directors.
“Legal observers say the Enron litigation could be a catalyst for impor-
tant changes in business policy.”32   “Senators have already called for
mandatory diversification in 401(k) plans, and [a bankruptcy specialist]
believes new accounting rules will follow.  Public company disclosure
requirements could also be refined.”33   It is predicted that the investors’
reaction in the aftermath of the Enron bankruptcy will lead to significant
changes in mandatory disclosure.  “[I]nvestors are demanding better, more
frequent, and more expansive information about companies’ financial
health.”34   Compare the reform predicted in Enron’s aftermath to the lack of
change in the aftermath of the Texaco and Coca-Cola settlements.  First,
there is no disclosure required by the Securities and Exchange Commission
regarding discrimination or any other social issues, and there was no call for
reform in this regard even in light of the egregiously discriminatory conduct
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endured by Texaco and Coca-Cola employees.  Second, there was a brief fall
in Texaco’s stock value when taped evidence of the discriminatory conduct
became public, but the company suffered no enduring financial harm.35
One of Enron’s most important lessons is that greater scrutiny of direc-
torial and managerial conduct and decision making is warranted.  Enron’s
other valuable lesson is that investor reaction and public and political dis-
satisfaction with corporate conduct is an effective way to enhance corporate
social responsibility and compliance with law.  Corporate boards and man-
agers are rightfully concerned with their public image.  They invest time and
money on public relations.  One of the best public relations tools, however,
is the kind of corporate social responsibility that includes compliance with
law and ethical corporate conduct.
PUBLIC RELATIONS, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
In the aftermath of the September 11 attack on the United States, an
ostensibly heightened sense of corporate social responsibility emerged.  The
chief executive officer (CEO) of Cantor Fitzgerald, one of the companies
formerly located in the World Trade Center, wept while he gave a television
interview describing the devastating losses suffered by his company, the
employees who perished, and their families.  Every New York area news-
paper in the days and weeks after the attack carried full-page messages
expressing profound sorrow.  What purpose did this outpouring of corporate
emotion serve?  Did these “advertisements” comfort the public?  Were the
sentiments expressed sincere?
Cynicism regarding the sincerity of corporate managements’ public
responses to the attack seemed justified.  After all, the newspaper messages,
while carefully designed not to look like advertising, all contained the
companies’ logos or names.  Moreover, shortly after his tearful television
appearance, and within two weeks after the attack, Cantor Fitzgerald’s CEO
stopped salary payments and suspended medical benefits for the survivors of
perished employees.  The families affected by this decision responded
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publicly, granting television interviews complaining about the severed
salaries and benefits.  In the aftermath of this bad publicity, Cantor Fitzgerald’s
CEO rescinded his decision to stop salaries and benefits.
Whether the corporate responses were sincere or not, the nation needed
to read the newspaper and billboard messages expressing sorrow and
patriotism from corporate citizens.  They expressed sentiments we all shared,
but as individuals, few of us were able to afford to pay for such public
displays of sadness and grief.  Corporations, acting as agents for the flesh
and blood people who compose them, had the money and the incentive to
provide this public and very expensive form of mourning.  This observation
illustrates the very important public role played by private enterprise.
Corporate reactions to the September 11 attack militate in favor of a broader
theory of what corporate social responsibility should be.  Contractarian goals
of shareholder wealth-maximization were achieved to the extent corporate
managers made the right public relations moves.  The right corporate
response could engender favorable public sentiment for a company, leading
to long-term profits derived from loyal consumers to whom the subliminal
messages were aimed.  Corporate managers used the broadest of com-
munitarian goals—the healing of a nation—to accomplish the contractarian
goal of eventual long-term shareholder wealth-maximization.  Corporate
reactions to the September 11 tragedy presented a view of non-shareholder
constituencies inextricably linked to traditional corporate constituents.  Post-
tragedy publicity highlighted the interconnectedness of shareholders,
officers, and directors on one hand, and non-shareholder constituencies such
as employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, and the communities in which
the companies do business on the other.  This time, however, communitarian
efforts were aimed at a national community.
This broader view of communitarianism requires a broader view of
corporate social responsibility.  It leads to the observation that socially
responsible conduct should be the imperative not only of corporate officers
and directors but also of corporate lawyers and consumers.  Corporate
lawyers can play a role in achieving shareholder and social wealth maximi-
Comparisons Between Enron and Other Types of Corporate Misconduct 107
zation.  Also worthy of examination is the role of the community in general,
and of consumers in particular, in enhancing corporate social responsibility.
First, however, a closer examination of what corporate social responsibility
should mean is required.
The traditional notion of corporate communitarianism is that officers and
directors may consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies such
as suppliers, creditors, consumers, employees, and communities in which
the company does business when making business decisions.  Related to this
philosophy is the traditional notion of corporate social responsibility that
encourages charitable corporate conduct.  The impact of corporate activity
on non-shareholder constituencies is regulated by state and federal labor,
discrimination, commercial, securities, banking, environmental, and consumer
laws.  Traditional theories of corporate social responsibility encourage
companies to go beyond that which is required under the law for the benefit
of these non-shareholder constituencies.  It is a request that corporations do
something extra for the world in which they do business.  The most typical
example is the practice of charitable giving.  Corporations make charitable
donations perhaps to be good citizens, but the public relations value of
corporate giving is obvious.36   Less obvious in a profit-maximizing sense is
the type of corporate social responsibility that may benefit non-shareholder
groups affected by corporate activity in a way that does not have broad
public relations value.
Another kind of socially responsible or irresponsible behavior can be found
in corporate responses in the face of alleged wrongdoing on the part of
corporate employees and managers.  Finally, there is a kind of corporate
social responsibility that is mandated under labor, discrimination, commer-
cial, securities, banking, environmental and consumer laws that should be
distinguished from the kind of corporate social responsibility that asks
businesses to achieve social good even when it is not required by law.
What are the corporate governance issues that arise when considering the
various types of corporate social responsibility suggested above?  Corporate
lawyers can help corporate boards and managers make decisions that
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diligently ensure compliance with law.  External law that governs private
corporate conduct is often open to conflicting interpretations.  For example,
while it is clear that Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination,37  discrimi-
natory conduct is not easily recognized.  Discrimination in the workplace
may be unconscious; it is often covert and subtle; therefore, it is difficult to
detect.  Corporate lawyers can help managers interpret the law in a way that
ensures responsible behavior towards employees.  This means that corporate
lawyers will have to help change the way corporate boards make decisions
and supervise the conduct of corporate officers.  Lawyers must encourage
corporate directors to avoid the psychological pitfalls of group decision
making that prevent the adequate monitoring of corporate compliance with
law.  Moreover, community activists can play a role that enhances socially
responsible corporate behavior by publicizing and protesting against
corporate conduct that harms employees or other constituencies.
Similar opportunities for corporate lawyers and community activists to
encourage corporate social responsibility are present in the context of
discrimination against consumers and communities in which companies do
business.  Traditional considerations of the impact of corporate activity on
non-shareholder constituencies have focused on the decisions made by
corporate officers and directors.  In this respect, the broader model for
potential participants in, and contributors to, efforts aimed at enhancing
corporate social responsibility described above would require an element of
self-responsibility on the part of consumers who can make decisions about
where they shop, making discrimination against consumers and environmental
hazards in minority communities less than profit-maximizing.  Consumers
can decide not to patronize companies that discriminate.  Community
activists can organize boycotts against such companies.
Corporate lawyers can help directors and senior executives understand
that in large companies unlawful or discriminatory conduct on the part of
some employees may be inevitable.  This should be easier in the aftermath
of Enron.  It is more difficult, in Enron’s aftermath, to claim surprise
about directorial and managerial wrongdoing.  Lawyers can help corporate
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managers respond more appropriately to inevitable allegations of wrong-
doing.  Lawyer’s can help corporate managers protect the public image of
their companies by encouraging them to make socially responsible choices
that include diligent compliance with applicable law.
CONCLUSION
Corporate officers and directors care deeply about the public images of
their companies.  Even though there is no empirical evidence that links
charitable giving to profitability,38  companies continue to make charitable
donations and efforts as a way of ensuring a positive public image.39   Since
companies are rightfully concerned with public relations, one strategy for
achieving social justice is to publicize corporate wrongdoing that harms
non-shareholder groups.
Corporate lawyers should help their clients to understand that charity is
helpful, but charity alone is not sufficient.  The greatest social contributions
that companies can make relate to the corporate governance decisions that
have a potentially adverse effect on non-shareholder constituencies such as
employees, consumers, and communities in which the companies do busi-
ness.  Good corporate citizenship should start with greater internal moni-
toring of compliance with law.  This is applicable to the laws that prohibit
racial discrimination as well as the laws relating to accounting and
financial disclosure.
Any public relations benefit derived from a company’s charitable
donations can be completely eviscerated by company wrongdoing.  Enron
provides a compelling example of the paradox of corporate charitable giving
while at the same time engaging in conduct that harms shareholders,
employees, and other non-shareholder constituencies, including the national
community.  While some Enron managers decided to donate significant
portions of the company’s funds to various charities,40  other Enron man-
agers personally enriched themselves at the expense of the company’s
shareholders and non-shareholder constituents.41
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Important changes in business policy and governance will occur in Enron’s
aftermath.  Corporate governance reform, however, should not be limited
to matters relating to a company’s financial health.  Enron teaches us that
heightened scrutiny may be warranted in other contexts of corporate wrong-
doing such as racial discrimination.
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